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The functioning of the labor market often has been stressed as a clear 
determinant in explaining poverty trends in developed countries. In this paper, 
we analyze the role of gender wage discrimination on household poverty rates 
in several EU countries, linking two related phenomena that rarely are 
analyzed together. In order to quantify the impact of discrimination on 
poverty, we propose the construction of a counterfactual distribution of wages 
where discrimination against women has been removed. Using this new wage 
distribution, we compute total household income and compare poverty rates 
in the absence of discrimination to those actually observed. Our results show 
that, in general, it is true that discrimination against women plays a 
determinant role in the current levels of poverty, even if we discover that 
results for each country present a different pattern and intensity. Further, we 
find that the effect of discrimination on poverty risk dramatically increases for 
individuals in households who largely depend on working female earnings, 
especially in the case of single mothers. 
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1. Introduction 
Poverty has been shown to be a quite persistent phenomenon in rich countries, even in 
the presence of sustained macroeconomic growth. Among the main factors determining 
this persistence, the role played by individual labor market opportunities emerges as 
crucial.
3 Indeed, out of all possible labor market transitions, participation of adult 
household members has been revealed as important for allowing poor households to 
move above the poverty threshold and preventing vulnerable households to possibly fall 
below that critical line.
4  
The existence of economic or cultural barriers to the complete integration of specific 
groups of individuals in the labor market will be expected to reduce employment rates 
and to lower the effective wages of discriminated workers. In general, a lower 
participation rate or a lower wage of a group of individuals, evaluated in a household 
context, will imply a higher vulnerability of a large number of individuals in the 
population, given that poverty risk would rise not only among those who suffer 
discrimination but also among all individuals inserted in households who depend on 
discriminated individuals’ earnings. We believe that this type of approach can help in 
explaining why specific demographic or socioeconomic groups face higher poverty 
rates in a large number of developed countries. In particular, gender is one of the most 
usual sources of worker discrimination in developed countries. This paper centers the 
discussion on the potential effects on household members’ poverty risk when 
eliminating wage discrimination of all working females’ contributions to household 
total income. 
Until now and up to our knowledge, the evaluation of how the level of labor market 
discrimination faced by women affects the living conditions of their households has not 
yet been addressed in the literature. The studies on gender wage gap typically provide a 
measure of the aggregate unexplained gender wage gap or, eventually, they include a 
more complete analysis of its variation across the pay distribution. At the same time, 
within the income distribution literature, an increasing number of papers in recent years 
have reached the conclusion that female-headed households face a large poverty risk. 
However, the economic literature often has missed the link between labor market 
                                                 
3 See for instance the discussion in Hoynes et al. (2006) about the role of the labor market in explaining 
poverty trends in the U.S. 
4 Two examples of how labor events affect poverty dynamics can be found in Jenkins and Rigg (2001) 
and Cantó (2003).   4
discrimination and household poverty. There are reasons to think that this linkage may 
be largely informative because discrimination is substantially shrinking the earnings of 
women while an increasing number of households’ income level is strongly determined 
by these earnings. For this reason, the aim of this paper is precisely to bridge this gap, 
proposing an empirical procedure for quantifying the impact of wage discrimination 
against women on household poverty and household income inequality. 
We use the data from the last wave of the European Community Household Panel 
(ECHP), carried out in 2001 in several EU countries that register different levels and 
evolution patterns in female labor market participation. For each country, we estimate a 
counterfactual household income distribution where current female wage earnings are 
replaced by those they would obtain if discrimination was removed. By comparing the 
levels of poverty and inequality computed using the actual income distribution to those 
computed using the counterfactual one, we provide a measure of the effects of 
discrimination on household income distribution. In order to make this procedure 
operative, we need to construct the household’s counterfactual income distribution by 
estimating an individual discrimination gap for every working woman, which we will 
add to her current wage. The pay gap is obtained by running wage equations separately 
by gender and sector (public or private) for each country, taking into account the virtual 
existence of selection bias. With this simple procedure, we are able to analyze the 
distributive impact of discrimination in twelve EU countries. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the results in the related literature. 
Section 3 presents the methodology for measuring the effect of discrimination on the 
income distribution. In section 4, we describe the estimation procedure while in section 
5, we undertake all the empirical analysis. The final section concludes by summarizing 
the main results. 
2. The Related Literature 
Gender is a source of worker discrimination to which the literature has paid much 
attention, in recent years. For most countries, the increase in female labor participation 
during the last decades has, in effect, dramatically changed the traditional male bread-
winner family model where wives’ earnings were just pin money playing a negligible 
role in the household budget. The consequences on household incomes of these changes 
are not clear a priori. The result depends on how the proportional increase in family 
incomes due to female earnings is distributed across households at different points of   5
the income distribution. Some empirical evidence during the 1980s in the U.S. (e.g., 
Juhn and Murphy, 1997; Karoly and Burtless, 1995) showed that wives’ earnings 
contributed to the increase in inequality trends, given that employment and wage gains 
for wives of middle- and high-wage men were significantly larger than those for the 
rest. However, some more evidence for the U.S. in Reed and Cancian (2001) or Daly 
and Valletta (2006) appears to conclude instead that wives’ earnings in that country 
actually have offset household inequality increasing trends. Harkness et al. (1997), 
using UK data, also provided evidence on an equalizing effect of female earnings on 
the married couples’ income distribution in a period when inequality and poverty in 
Britain registered a rising trend. These authors additionally show that female earnings 
were critical in preventing poverty among married women in the UK but failed to do so 
in the case of single-mother families.
5 Additional evidence about the role of wives in 
preventing their households from falling into poverty has been provided by Maître et al. 
(2003) for the EU countries and by Cattan (1998) for the case of ethnic groups in the 
U.S.. 
An extensive and growing literature in labor economics has emphasized that working 
women, in spite of their increasing success in entering the labor market and in reducing 
their wage gap, are still far from facing the same opportunities than men have.
6 Indeed, 
even in countries displaying the greatest levels of gender equality, women still continue 
to encounter difficulties for balancing work and family life. They less often are 
promoted in their professional career or are unable to reach working conditions similar 
to those enjoyed by men. Researchers have tried to evaluate and explain the existence 
of gender segregation and gender gaps in participation, wages and unemployment rates 
                                                 
5 Some more evidence exists about the equalizing effect of increasing female labor attachment on 
household income distribution in European countries. For instance, Alba and Collado (1999), Ruiz-
Castillo and Sastre (2001) and Gradín and Otero (2001) analyze the Spanish case where, during the 
1980s, there was a sharp increase in female labor participation jointly with a consistent decrease in 
household income inequality. The last of the three cited papers argues that the equalization effect in Spain 
is a result of the larger size of the equalizing effect on household income inequality of the increase in the 
wages of those women already in-work compared to the opposite effect that the increase in participation 
of highly-educated women imposed. 
6 According to the OECD (2004) report, the average rate of female labor participation in the European 
Union has increased in 7 percentage points between 1990 and 2003 (from 54.5 to 61.3), and a similar 
trend has been observed in the United States, Canada, Australia and Japan. Note, however, that this 
increasing average trend hides remarkable differences in the levels of participation across European 
countries. While Nordic countries like Sweden, Norway, Finland or Denmark register over 70 percent of 
female participation, Southern European countries like Spain, Italy or Greece do not reach 55 percent. 
Note also that Blau (1998) reports a substantial reduction in several gender gaps for American women 
between 1970 and 1995, after which, however, significant gaps still remain.   6
in several countries.
7 Within these, it is the analysis of the gender wage gap that has 
received the most attention. In fact, the large number of results on gender wage gaps 
from a large list of countries allows us to conclude that differences in human capital 
accumulation between men and women cannot fully explain the empirically-observed 
gender pay differences, indicating that they must be a result of different returns to 
similar characteristics by gender.
8  
We believe that a direct consequence of the existence of a gender gap could be, for 
example, the high and increasing poverty rates observed among female-headed families 
in many countries that the income distribution literature identifies with a feminization of 
poverty.
9 We argue that most of the countries whose women currently are facing 
discrimination would be paying a cost in terms of higher poverty levels due to two 
different factors: the fact that many working women receive lower wages than they 
should, given their endowments, and the fact that there are many women out of work as 
a consequence of a low female employment rate. An additional cost could be the 
potential increase in household income inequality, even if we should note that the 
impact of discrimination on household income inequality (increasing or decreasing the 
level of income inequality in the total population) depends on where in the income 
distribution the actual women facing discrimination are inserted: in the richest or in the 
poorest households.  
We are conscious that the adequate quantification of the effect of wage discrimination 
on the distribution of income is a very difficult task, mainly because if discrimination 
were removed, apart from female wages, many decisions on participation or choices of 
occupation, sector or number of hours worked would change. However, despite the 
limitations of a static approach, we believe that undertaking this exercise gives us a 
rough measure of how relevant discrimination is in order to explain current levels of 
poverty or inequality. This measure may help us, for example, in evaluating how 
important equal-opportunity policies may be in the aim of fighting against poverty and 
social exclusion in different socioeconomic and demographic contexts. 
                                                 
7 See Altonji and Blank (1999) for a good survey on this literature. Recent examples are Anker (1998), 
Petrongolo (2004), Antecol (2000) and Azmat et al. (2006). 
8 See, for instance, Arulampalam et al. (2005) for a recent comparison across EU countries. Additionally, 
Blau and Khan (2003) analyze determinant factors of unexplained gender wage gaps across countries. 
9 Albelda (1999) argues that in the U.S., this phenomenon is particularly large, in comparison to Europe, 
due to a particularly inadequate social welfare system regarding families’ needs.   7
3. Measuring the Effect of Discrimination on Poverty and Inequality 
Let  )   ,..., .., . , (
1 H h x x x x =  be the vector of observed household incomes where each 
household is identified by the superscript  H h ,..., 1 = . If subscript i refers to a specific 
individual living in h, we can write household’s h total income, x
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where i y  represents the hourly wage of each individual i (equal to zero in case she is 
not in employment),  i t is the number of hours actually worked and  i λ  is her income 
from other sources different from wages. Thus x
h is equal to the sum of earnings and 
incomes from any other source received by all household members.
10  
Let  ) *   ,..., * .., . , * ( *
1 H h x x x x =  be the counterfactual distribution in the case of absence 
of discrimination against women, which we compute by replacing each working 
woman’s wage  i y  by the wage she would obtain, was discrimination removed,  i y* . 
Thus we can now write: 
,        with                                  
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where  i g  is the hourly pay gap faced by member i (equal to zero in case females do not 
face any discrimination at all). Note that this term also may be interpreted as an hourly 
gender-specific  transfer compensating the discrimination suffered by each woman 
which, if removed in order to construct a counterfactual wage, would increase her 
observed hourly wage i y . Alternatively,  i g  can be viewed as a gender-specific tax per 
hour of work that women have to pay when entering the labor market, thus reducing 
what could be defined as their market potential wage i y* . Additionally, 
h g  is the 
compensation given to each household in order to construct its counterfactual income 
due to the amount of discrimination suffered by all working females in the household. 
Thus, the only difference between the actual income vector x and its counterfactual 
correspondent  x*  is ) ,..., ( 1 H g g g = , the discrimination vector. Then we have 
                                                 
10 Typically, households’ incomes then are adjusted by the number of equivalent adults co-habiting in the 
household in order to allow for comparisons of households of a different size. 
   8
g x x + = * . Note that in the simple case, we are assuming that the number of hours 
worked  i t  and all incomes other than wages  i λ  are unaffected by discrimination. 
However, it is straightforward to extend this framework to the case where both 
components change.
11 
The simplest way to capture the absolute effect of discrimination on poverty in this 
context is to compute a poverty indicator (for instance, the head-count ratio), P(), 
before and after the compensation  g  takes place, and compute their difference: 
  ,    ) , ( ) *, ( ) *, , ( pl x P pl x P pl x x P − = Δ  
where pl stands for the poverty line considered. The relative impact on poverty could 
then be expressed as: 
  ,    100
) , (
) *, , (
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so that the impact of discrimination on poverty will positively depend upon the number 
of discriminated women whose equivalent income lies below the poverty line and the 
importance of the discrimination gap they face. 
In a similar way, one can compute the absolute and relative impacts of discrimination 
on inequality as: 








= Δ  
I() being any inequality index.  
It is straightforward that the distributional impact of discrimination will be neutral in 
the case that  g  is distributed proportionally to initial incomes x ( 0 = ΔI ). On the 
contrary, the compensation for discrimination would be regressive as far as  g  is 
proportionally higher in top-income households ( 0 > ΔI ) and progressive in the 
opposite case ( 0 < ΔI ).
12 
                                                 
11 Consider, for instance, the case where an unemployed woman receiving an unemployment social 
benefit accepts a job offer as a consequence of the higher market wage when discrimination is removed. 
In that case,  i t*  would indicate the new number of hours worked without discrimination while  i * λ  
would accommodate the reduction in social benefits. 
12 Alternatively, if one regards  g  as a discrimination tax, it would be regressive (progressive) if  0 < ΔI  
( 0 > ΔI ).   9
The reader should note that any other alternative method already proposed in the 
income distribution literature in order to analyze the contribution to income inequality 
and poverty of an income source would also apply here. We simply would have to 
consider the compensation for discrimination  g  as an additional source of household 
income.
13 
4. Estimating the Counterfactual Income 
A crucial point in order to make the previous procedure empirically operative is to 
properly estimate the counterfactual income vector x*. For that, we need an adequate 
estimation of the hourly wage gap  i g  for each working woman. 
In the literature, discrimination usually is measured as the wage gap between male and 
female workers who are identical in their relevant productivity characteristics such as 
education and experience. Mincerian equations as the following are estimated separately 
by gender for the logarithm of the hourly wage  i y  conditioning on those variables that 
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where subscript m stands for men and f for women,  ' Z  are the corresponding vectors of 
characteristics, β  are vectors of returns rates to characteristics and u  are the error term 
vectors. As is well-known, the classical Oaxaca-Blinder approach breaks down the 
unconditional wage gap into two distinct components. One component is explained by 
the different endowments of characteristics of the average male and female worker, and 
another one that emerges from the different labor market returns to similar 
characteristics. So we can write: 
  ) ˆ - ˆ ( ˆ ) Z - Z (   ) ln( - ) ln( ' ' '
f m f m f m f m Z y y β β β + =  
In this context, we can go one step further as Jenkins (1994) and Del Río et al. (2006) 
do, and make use of the predicted wage at the individual level. Assuming that male 
returns are those prevailing in the absence of discrimination, following Del Río et al. 
                                                 
13 See Shorrocks (1982, 1988) for different alternatives or Sastre and Trannoy (2002) for Shapley 
decomposition. For comparing the impact of discrimination on poverty and inequality in different income 
distributions, a more robust analysis, similar to those based on stochastic dominance, easily can be 
undertaken in this framework.   10
(2006), for every working woman, we can compute her two predicted hourly wages: 
that using female returns to characteristics, 
i f y ˆ , and that she would obtain if her 
endowments were remunerated just as male ones are, 
i f r ˆ . For the OLS case, this could 
be written as: 
) 2 / ˆ ˆ exp( ˆ
) 2 / ˆ ˆ exp( ˆ
2 '
2 '
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where 
2 ˆ f σ  is the estimated variance of uf.
14 The estimated individual wage gap 
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i i f f i f y r g − = ,         (2) 
indicates the hourly wage discrimination of female worker i, and the vector 
) g ˆ   ,..., ˆ ( ˆ
1 N f f f g g =  is the discrimination vector for all working women in a population 
N. Thus, a given woman is considered to be discriminated when a man with the same 
relevant characteristics obtains a higher predicted wage. Thus, for each woman, the gap 
will depend upon her personal characteristics and the market returns differentials by 
gender.  
Consequently, moving to a household context, we now are able to estimate the total 
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which, for the whole population, is a new counterfactual income vector such that: 
g x x ˆ * ˆ + = .  
It is important to note here that the values in the household counterfactual income vector 
will crucially depend on how the individual wage gap was estimated for each working 
woman. Our methodological proposal accommodates all the different alternatives 
available in the relevant literature in order to estimate this gap. For instance, the wage 
structure that would prevail in the lack of discrimination could differ from that of males. 
Also, the empirical specification of the wage regression could either include or exclude 
                                                 
14 Exp ( 2 / ˆ ˆ '
2
f f fi Z σ β + ) is the expected value of the log-normal variable yf conditioned on Zfi in the OLS 
regression. Note that in the case of estimating wage equations using Quantile Regressions, expression (1) 
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β β = =  where q stands for the corresponding quantile.   11
specific employment variables such as occupation, job status, type of contract, etc. 
Depending on which of these variables are included in the regression of the estimated 
pay gap, the measure of gender wage discrimination would be including all or just a part 
of job segregation. Finally, a variety of econometric methods (Ordinary Least Squares, 
Quantile Regression, etc.) can be used for the estimation of Mincerian wage equations, 
which eventually allow for the control of the selection bias imposed by the lack of 
information on the wages of not-employed potential workers. 
 
5. The Effect of Discrimination on Poverty and Inequality in the EU 
The following empirical analysis is based on the last wave of the European Community 
Household Panel Survey (ECHP), conducted in 2001. The advantage of this database, 
compared to others used in the analysis of European labor markets (such as the Wage 
Structure Surveys) is that it provides us the necessary information to link the labor 
market situation of the individual to her household living conditions. Most precisely, 
this database combines detailed labor information at the individual level required to 
estimate discrimination gaps with the necessary demographic and socioeconomic 
information on households in order to undertake the analysis of household income 
distribution. Further, all the population living in private households are eligible to be 
part of the sample, thus no particular labor market sector or activity is being excluded 
from observation as often happens in labor-market-specific surveys. All countries that 
were members of the EU15 in 2001 are included in the ECHP, except Sweden. Note, 
however, that for different reasons, Luxembourg and The Netherlands could not be 
included in the analysis
15, and we will present results on 12 EU countries. 
  5.1 Female labor participation and poverty 
As is known—and our results show in Table 1—female participation rates are 
significantly different in the European countries we analyze. However, in most of the 
countries considered, participation rates and, most strongly, the shares of employees 
among poor females, generally are very low. According to the last two columns of this 
table, wage earner rates are low for poor females in countries with a low average 
female participation rate (such as those situated in the Mediterranean area), but also for 
those in countries where average female participation is high (such as the Northern 
                                                 
15 Luxembourg was excluded because of its small population size, while The Netherlands was excluded 
because since December 2003, the share of population holding a university degree in the ECHP is 
implausibly small.   12
European group).
16 Indeed, even in countries like Denmark, Finland or Portugal (all 
three registering a female participation rate above 80 percent), there is a large 
employment gap between poor and non-poor females. The same happens in countries 
like Italy and Greece, where only 13 percent of poor females aged between 25 and 55 
earn a wage while up to 50 percent (in Italy) or 42 percent (in Greece) of non-poor 
females are wage-earners. Spain is a similar case and registers one of the largest 
differences between the two last columns of Table 1 (18 vs. 52 percent).
17 It seems as 
if, in most of the countries considered, whatever their average female participation and 
employment rates, policies aimed to remove the barriers to labor market access at the 
bottom of the income distribution could play a significant role in reducing poverty and 
social exclusion by pushing an important number of poor females into work. 
 
 
Table 1. Female labor market information: poor and non-poor households 
 
females aged 25 to 55    






unemployment rate  wage earners 
%  Country 
Total poor  non 
poor  Total poor  non 
poor  Total poor  non 
poor  Total poor  non 
poor 
Germany  50  46 51 78  65 80 5  19 4 66  41 68 
Denmark  55  23 61 90  55 92 5  17 5 81  37 85 
Belgium  53  43 54 78  42 82 4  26 3 67  26 72 
France  54  45 56 75  48 79 8  31 6 66  28 72 
UK  52  35 56 77  37 82 - -  - 71  30 77 
Ireland  56  44 60 64  35 70 5  16 4 57  23 63 
Italy  52  50 53 64  46 68  17  64  11  44  13 50 
Greece  50  32 54 61  51 63  12  30  10  38  13 42 
Spain  52  45 54 64  48 67  13  43 9 47  18 52 
Portugal  52  35 56 80  59 82 5  13 4 59  25 64 
Austria  54  33 56 78  57 80 4  12 4 65  29 67 
Finland  54  39 56 86  63 89 8  45 4 74  31 79 
unweighted 
average 
53  39 56 75  51 78 7  26 5 61  26 66 
Source: Own calculations using ECHP (2001) 
Note: An individual is counted as poor if her equivalent income is below 60% median equivalent income 
in her country; see the definition of poverty in section 5.2. 
                                                 
16 The only exception to this pattern is Germany, which shows, compared to the rest, a relatively small 
gap between poor females and non-poor females participation rates: 41 percent of wage-earners among 
the poor and 68 percent among the rest. 
17 This result for Spain can be explained by the combined effect of a low activity rate and a huge 
unemployment rate among poor females in this country.   13
 
  5.2 Actual and counterfactual household income 
Our estimations of the counterfactual household income for each country are based on a 
set of four regressions of the log of hourly wage on education and experience, run 
separately for each sector (public and private) and gender. Actual experience is 
captured through different proxies: age, age squared, tenure in current employment, the 
existence of previous experience and short and long-term spells of unemployment 
during the previous five years. Regional dummies also are included in each regression, 
and the eventual existence of selection bias in those men and women with an observed 
wage is corrected in all cases using the Full Maximum Likelihood procedure. Further, 
male and female observations at the top and bottom percentiles of the wage distribution 
have not been used in regressions, in order to limit the effects of eventual distortions of 
results due to measurement error. According to this specification of the wage equation, 
the estimated wage gap may be interpreted as discrimination in a wide sense: women 
working either in the private or the public sectors are paid differently than men with the 
same education and experience, while living in the same region. Thus, any wage gap 
generated by gender segregation by job type in the same sector is considered here to be 
included in discrimination. However, in section 5.4 we also will consider the effect of 
including a list of additional variables in the regression that describe the actual job in 
more detail (firm activity and size, type of contract held [i.e., fixed-term or 
undetermined and full or part-time], type of occupation, job status and information on 
over-qualification for the job). This second specification measures discrimination in a 
narrower sense: men and women with similar education and experience working in 
similar jobs in the same region are paid differently. 
Table 2 presents the raw and estimated gender wage gaps conditional on education and 
experience.
18 From these results, it appears that gender wage discrimination affects all 
of the European countries considered, even if with a widely-different intensity and a 
distinct public-private pattern. Indeed, in all countries with the exception of Denmark, 
the estimated gender wage gap due to different returns to characteristics (i.e., not 
explained by education and experience) in the private sector is 80 percent or more of 
the observed one. Southern European countries like Spain or Portugal show high 
discrimination in the private sector but low in the public one. Countries like Denmark 
                                                 
18 Table A1.a in the Appendix summarizes the main results of the corresponding wage regressions.   14
or Belgium show low discrimination in both sectors, which is precisely the opposite of 
what seems to be happening in Germany or France. 
 
Table 2. Gender wage gap in EU countries 
 

























Germany  30.0 0.248 0.221  89.2 0.317  0.263  82.9 
Denmark  54.5 0.031 0.007  23.1 0.065  0.054  82.5 
Belgium  37.1 0.065 0.066  101.9 0.067  0.059  88.7 
France  39.1 0.165 0.192  116.4 0.208  0.227  109.4 
UK  32.2 0.203 0.178  88.0 0.139  0.151  108.0 
Ireland  28.1 0.097 0.121  124.6 0.195  0.147  75.4 
Italy  38.7 0.177 0.187  106.0 0.022  0.015  66.2 
Greece  34.7 0.322 0.288  89.5  0.076 -0.085  -111.1 
Spain  23.1 0.321 0.343  106.6 0.081  0.075  92.7 
Portugal  25.4 0.281 0.319  113.5 0.079  0.061  77.3 
Austria  28.4 0.147 0.121  81.9 0.047  0.019  39.3 
Finland  49.8 0.068 0.098  144.4 0.122  0.134  109.9 
unweighted 
average  35.1 0.177 0.178  98.8 0.118  0.093  68.4 
Note: The raw wage gap is computed as the difference between the log male and log female hourly wage. 
The estimated gap is the gap explained by different returns (i.e. that not explained through different 
endowments). 
Source: Own calculations using ECHP (2001) 
 
Our proposal here is to go beyond the Oaxaca-Blinder approach and estimate, for each 
woman, her corresponding discrimination gap according to expression (2) based on her 
predicted wage under both alternative return schemes with and without discrimination, 
as in expression (1). In the first column of Table 3, we report the number of women 
who suffer some wage gap, and results show that a large majority of them (on average, 
85 percent) are discriminated. The lowest number of discriminated females is found in 
countries like Denmark and Greece (61 and 69 percent, respectively) and the largest in 
Portugal, France, Germany, Spain or Finland, all above 90 percent. Table 3 also 
provides the average discrimination gap that lies above 2 euros per hour in Germany 
and France, and is only around 60 cents in Denmark or Belgium. When we measure the 
gap in relative terms (as a proportion of female current hourly wage), Spanish female 
earners face the largest average discrimination gap (almost 40 percent), while Danish 
females again are those facing the lowest one (only 6 percent). Disaggregating workers 
by sector, we find that in all countries, 90 percent or more of female workers in the 
private sector receive a wage that is below her expected wage, were she remunerated as 
a man, with the only exception of Denmark, where the percentage drops to 54 percent.   15
In some countries—like Spain, Italy, Austria and especially, Greece—the proportion of 
women facing some discrimination in the public sector, and the size of their gap, is 
substantially smaller than in the private sector. 
 
 
Table 3. Estimated discrimination gap among working women in EU countries 
 
All female wage earners  Private Sector  Public Sector 































Germany  91.9 2.1  33.6  90.0 1.9 32.0 96.5  2.5  37.4 
Denmark  60.8 0.6 6.0  54.0 0.3 3.3  66.4 0.8 8.2 
Belgium  81.9 0.6 8.2  90.5 0.6 7.8  67.3 0.6 8.9 
France  96.5 2.1  28.5  96.7 1.8 26.6 96.2  2.6  31.3 
UK  88.5 2.0  24.0  92.1 1.9 24.5 81.0  2.1  22.8 
Ireland  87.0 1.5  18.0  89.4 1.3 16.4 80.9  2.1  21.8 
Italy  82.4 0.8  14.9  99.6 1.1 21.7 55.0  0.3  4.1 
Greece  69.2 0.7  22.2  100.0  1.1 33.6 11.0  0.0  0.6 
Spain  90.4 1.7  39.0  100.0  1.9 46.1 58.6  0.9  15.2 
Portugal  93.3 0.8  32.7  100.0  1.0 40.4 73.4  0.4  10.2 
Austria  82.0 0.8  13.2  94.2 0.9 15.6 51.1  0.5  7.2 
Finland  90.1 1.0  14.4  89.5 0.9 12.4 90.7  1.2  16.4 
unweighted 
average  84.5 1.2  21.2  91.3 1.2 23.4 69.0  1.2  15.4 
Source: Own calculations using ECHP (2001) 
Having estimated the discrimination gap for each female wage earner, the next step is 
to aggregate individual discrimination gaps within households so that we then can 
compute the counterfactual household income vector by adding the compensation for 
discrimination to all original family incomes.  
Results are presented in Table 4. The first three columns of this table summarize, for all 
countries, the actual households’ income average, the average value (in euros) of total 
female wages in the household and its weight within total family income, all in 
equivalent income terms
19. Thus for Germany, for instance, the mean households’ 
equivalent income is 1,319 euros per month, out of which 244 (almost 19 percent) 
come from the contribution of female wage earners in the household. The average share 
of household income in EU countries coming from female wages varies from the lowest 
level of 14 percent in Greece (17 percent in Italy and Spain) to the highest levels of 25-
30 percent in Ireland, Finland and Denmark. It is interesting to note that this share 
would increase up to between 40 to 50 percent in most countries if we restrict our 
                                                 
19 Equivalent household’s income is the current total monthly household’s net income divided by the 
number of equivalent adults using a modified OECD scale (which weights 1.0 the first adult, 0.5 other 
individuals aged 14 or over who are living in the household and 0.3 children aged less than 14 years).   16
analysis to households with at least one female wage earner among their members. 
Thus, even if the point about the relevance of female wages in European family income 
often is missed in the analysis of household economics, we have calculated that in 
countries like Finland, Ireland or Denmark, up to 18 percent of all households obtain 
half or more than half of their total incomes from female wages. This largely contrasts 
with the results for Greece, Italy or Spain, where this percentage drops to 10 percent. 
 
Table 4. Households’ incomes in EU countries: monthly average amounts per equivalent adult 
 





















































Germany  1,319 244  18.9 67  5.3  1,386  311  20.9 
Denmark  1,691 519  28.9 26  1.5  1,717  545  29.6 
Belgium  1,190 287  23.0 21  1.7  1,211  308  23.6 
France  1,354 331  23.7 72  5.5  1,426  402  25.6 
UK  1,854 407  20.8 79  4.4  1,933  485  22.6 
Ireland  1,269 335  26.6 49  3.9  1,317  383  27.2 
Italy  882 164 17.1  21 2.3  902  185 18.1 
Greece  649 102 14.3  18 2.9  667  119 15.4 
Spain  847 172 17.3  48 5.9  896  220 19.6 
Portugal  640 151 21.7  35 6.3  676  186 24.5 
Austria  1,258 259  19.8 31  2.4  1,288  289  20.8 
Finland  1,199 344  26.7 48  3.8  1,247  392  28.1 
unweighted 
average  1,179 276  21.6 43  3.8  1,222  319  23.0 
Note: Households’ equivalent income is monthly disposable income by any source (actual or 
counterfactual) divided by the number of equivalent adults (modified OECD equivalent scale: 1 for the first 
adult, 0.5 for the rest of adults and 0.3 for children). 
Source: Own calculations using ECHP (2001) 
 
The fourth and fifth columns in Table 4 show the average estimated household gender 
wage gap, both in euros per month and as a share of total family income. These are 
precisely the amounts that households would obtain additionally from female wages in 
the absence of female wage discrimination. The quantities vary from only 18 euros per 
equivalent adult in Greece to 79 in the UK. In relative terms, the largest compensation 
is found for Portuguese and Spanish households (around 6 percent of household 
income), closely followed by German and French families (above 5 percent). In the 
opposite situation, Danish and Belgian households would obtain less than 2 percent of 
their actual incomes if discrimination was compensated. The resulting counterfactual   17
households’ income and female wages by country (after adding the compensation for 
discrimination) are displayed in the last three columns in Table 4. Comparing these 
columns with the first three columns of this table, we can see that in Germany, for 
instance, female wages mean contribution to households’ income would increase from 
244 euros per equivalent adult to 311 after removing discrimination, due to a 
compensation of 67 euros. As a consequence, in the German counterfactual household 
income distribution, female wages represent, on average, 21 percent of households’ 
income, instead of the 19 percent that is observed in the real distribution of incomes.  
  5.3 The impact of discrimination on poverty and inequality 
Having estimated the counterfactual household income distribution vector * x , we now 
are able to quantify the impact of discrimination on inequality and poverty:  I Δ and P Δ . 
With regard to inequality, the impact of removing female wage discrimination appears 
to be positive even if rather small, given that the Gini index is only slightly higher in 
most of the countries using the counterfactual distribution of incomes, compared to 
using the observed one (with the exception of Portugal), as reported in Table 5.
20 The 
reason for this result is that even if the household’s compensation for discrimination is 
largest for households whose total income is in the highest deciles of the income 
distribution, its final impact on inequality is small, given that it represents a relatively 
small share of total family income. Indeed, as Figure 1 shows, the relative 
compensation for discrimination has a roughly inverse-U shape in countries like Spain, 
Belgium, Finland, Germany and Portugal, reaching a maximum relative impact at the 
7
th or 8
th decile (or at the median for Portugal). Note, however, that some countries (like 
Denmark) do not show a clear pattern in the relative importance of compensations on 
total household income by deciles. 
                                                 
20 Similar results are obtained if we decide to use other inequality indices, such as those from the family 
of Generalized Entropy.   18
 





Country  ) (x I   *) (x I   r I Δ  
Germany  0.248 0.251  1.4 
Denmark  0.214 0.215  0.5 
Belgium  0.228 0.230  0.6 
France  0.297 0.298  0.5 
UK  0.304 0.304  0.2 
Ireland  0.284 0.288  1.1 
Italy  0.281 0.283  0.7 
Greece  0.333 0.333  0.1 
Spain  0.311 0.314  0.8 
Portugal  0.376 0.372 -1.3 
Austria  0.213 0.214  0.6 
Finland  0.252 0.257  1.7 
unweighted 
average  0.279 0.280  0.6 
Source: Own calculations using ECHP (2001) 
Figure 1 
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Focusing most particularly on the effects of discrimination on households at the bottom 
of the income distribution, we quantify the impact of female wage discrimination on 
household poverty. Table 6 reports the consistent reduction in the head-count and 
poverty gap ratios in all countries considered when using the 60 percent of the median 
equivalent income as the poverty threshold. The first half of the table displays the head-
count ratio (indicating poverty risk) for the whole population with actual and   19
counterfactual incomes, and the absolute and relative reduction after compensating 
households for discrimination. The largest poverty risk reduction is found in those 
countries whose female workers in the private sector registered the largest 
discrimination level: In Portugal and Spain, poverty risk reduces from 17.6 to 
approximately 15.8 percent. This means that almost 2 percent of their population, or 
about 10 percent of their corresponding poor people, would leave poverty if female 
wage discrimination disappears. In Germany, despite the fact that the absolute 
reduction in poverty risk is only 1.1 percent, the relative impact of removing 
discrimination is also large, similar to that of Portugal or Spain. In countries like 
Ireland, France and the UK, the reduction is somewhat smaller: Slightly over 1 percent 
of the whole population and above 6 percent of the currently poor would leave poverty. 
Finally, countries with the lowest female wage discrimination (like Belgium or 
Denmark) present small potential reductions of poverty risk, which are all below 0.5 
percent of their total population. Italy has also a small reduction in poverty rates when 
discrimination is removed, despite being a country that registers a medium level of 
female wage gap in the private sector. 
The last four columns in Table 6 repeat the same exercise, moving to a different 
poverty index: The poverty gap ratio is the product of the head-count ratio and the 
average poverty gap
21, thus it takes into account not only the number of households 
leaving poverty but also all eventual reductions in the poverty gap of those that remain 
poor. According to this second index, the largest poverty reduction takes place in 
Germany (14 percent), followed by Ireland (9.3 percent), and subsequently by Portugal, 
France, Spain and Austria (all around 7 percent). Interestingly, we find that 
compensating discrimination at the household level reduces poverty in all twelve 
European countries considered, which suggests that removing discrimination also 
would alleviate the severity of those remaining poor. In some of them, however, 
reductions fall to levels of below 5 percent of the index, making the change in the 
poverty risk particularly small. 
                                                 
21 The poverty gap is defined as distance between the poverty line and the income of each poor person, 
relative to the former. 
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Table 6. Impact of discrimination on poverty in EU countries 
 
 
Head-count ratio (H)  
number of poor / population (in %)
 
 
Poverty Gap ratio (HI) 
H · average poverty gap (in %) 
 
Country 
) (x P   *) (x P P Δ r P Δ ) (x P *) (x P P Δ   r P Δ  
Germany  10.1 9.1  -1.1  -10.5 2.1 1.8  -0.3  -13.9 
Denmark  13.8 13.4  -0.3  -2.4  2.4 2.3  -0.1  -4.2 
Belgium  11.2 10.8  -0.4  -3.6  1.8 1.7  -0.1  -4.6 
France  17.4 16.3  -1.1  -6.6  4.3 4.0  -0.3  -7.2 
UK  16.1 15.1  -1.0  -6.4  4.2 4.0  -0.2  -5.0 
Ireland  18.5 17.1  -1.4  -7.6  4.0 3.6  -0.4  -9.3 
Italy  17.7 17.3  -0.4  -2.2  4.7 4.5  -0.2  -4.0 
Greece  19.1 18.3  -0.8  -4.0  5.6 5.4  -0.2  -3.9 
Spain  17.6 15.9  -1.7  -9.7  4.4 4.1  -0.3  -7.4 
Portugal  17.6 15.8  -1.8  -10.2 5.0 4.6  -0.4  -7.3 
Austria  9.3 8.5  -0.7  -7.7  1.6 1.5  -0.1  -7.1 
Finland  14.0 13.4  -0.6  -4.5  3.6 3.4  -0.2  -4.7 
unweighted
average  15.2 14.3  -0.9  -6.3 3.6  3.4 -0.2  -6.5 
Source: Own calculations using ECHP (2001) 
In any case, it is the mixture of individuals in households that will be an important 
determinant of the differential effect of removing the gender wage gap on particular 
demographic or socioeconomic groups in countries with a similar absolute female wage 
gap. In fact, we should be aware that only those persons living in households with one 
or more female earners would directly benefit from removing female wage 
discrimination in the labor market. Table 7 shows that, in most countries (except 
Germany), the risk of poverty among those individuals living with female wage earners 
is relatively lower than the mean. However, there are large differences on poverty when 
removing female wage discrimination: In countries like Spain or Portugal, the reduction 
is large—above 50 percent of the index—while in others, the effect on poverty drops to 
levels around 20 to 30 percent. At the extreme, Denmark and Italy show particularly 
low percentages of change in these poverty risks that fall below a 15 percent reduction 
of the index. We should underline here that in countries like France, the UK and 
Germany, the effect is substantially larger if we only consider those households where 
female wages represent a half or more than a half of total household incomes.   21
 
Table 7. Impact of discrimination on poverty risks in EU countries:  
households with female earners 
Head-Count Ratio = number of poor / population (in %) 
 
 
Households with female earners 
 
Households with female wages 
being more than 50% of hh incomes  Country 
) (x P   *) (x P   P Δ   r P Δ   ) (x P   *) (x P   P Δ   r P Δ  
Germany  8.2 5.9  -2.3  -27.9  15.2  10.4  -4.8  -31.6 
Denmark  4.2 3.7  -0.5  -12.2  9.0  7.9  -1.1  -12.3 
Belgium  3.9 3.1  -0.8  -20.8  11.0  8.8  -2.2  -20.4 
France  7.6 5.2  -2.4  -31.1  12.3  7.0  -5.3  -42.9 
UK  6.1 4.2  -2.0  -32.0  11.5  6.9  -4.6  -40.3 
Ireland  7.6 4.8  -2.8  -36.5  15.3  10.8  -4.5  -29.4 
Italy  7.1 6.0  -1.0  -14.7  16.1  14.1  -2.0  -12.6 
Greece  6.1 3.6  -2.5  -40.6  15.3  9.6  -5.7  -37.1 
Spain  7.0 2.7  -4.3  -60.9  10.9  4.2  -6.7  -61.7 
Portugal  6.4 2.9  -3.4  -53.9  13.1  5.8  -7.3  -55.6 
Austria  4.0 2.6  -1.4  -35.2  10.2  6.9  -3.4  -33.0 
Finland  5.2 4.1  -1.2  -22.3  10.8  7.9  -2.9  -26.5 
unweighted 
average  6.1 4.1  -2.0  -32.3  12.6  8.4  -4.2  -33.6 
Source: Own calculations using ECHP (2001) 
Going into more detail, Table 8 reports the impact of discrimination on the poverty 
risks of two distinct groups of women: those more likely to be in work and who are 
between 25 and 55 years of age, and all those who actually earn a wage. In both cases, 
the poverty risk is somewhat lower than that of the average population, especially in the 
second case. However, the relative impact of removing discrimination is quite large on 
these individuals: about 15 percent of poor female adults would leave poverty in 
Germany, Portugal and Spain, and about 10 percent in France, the UK, Ireland, Austria 
and Finland. The impact becomes critical in the case of female wage earners; about 60 
percent of the poor would be pushed above the poverty line in Spain and Portugal, 30 
percent or more in the rest of the countries (with only a few exceptions—Denmark, 
Italy and Finland). 
   22
 
Table 8. Impact of discrimination on poverty risks in EU countries: females 
Head-Count Ratio = number of poor / population (in %) 
 
 
Females 25-55 years old 
 
Female wage earners 
Country 
) (x P   *) (x P   P Δ   r P Δ   ) (x P   *) (x P   P Δ   r P Δ  
Germany  9.4 8.1  -1.4  -14.5 6.8  4.9  -1.9  -28.0 
Denmark  7.4 7.0  -0.4  -5.8 5.0 4.5 -0.5  -10.3 
Belgium  9.7 8.8  -0.8  -8.6 4.2 3.0 -1.2  -29.6 
France  14.3 12.8  -1.6  -11.1 6.5  4.1  -2.4  -36.7 
UK  11.7 10.2  -1.5  -13.0 6.1  3.9  -2.2  -36.2 
Ireland  15.5 14.2  -1.3  -8.2 6.6 4.4 -2.2  -33.0 
Italy  16.6 16.1  -0.5  -3.1 5.5 4.6 -0.9  -16.3 
Greece  13.6 12.6  -1.0  -7.1 5.8 3.5 -2.3  -40.1 
Spain  15.3 13.0  -2.3  -14.9 6.1  2.3  -3.8  -62.3 
Portugal  11.5 9.8  -1.7  -15.2 4.8  2.0  -2.8  -58.5 
Austria  6.9 6.0  -0.9  -13.0 3.6  2.1  -1.5  -42.0 
Finland  11.3 10.1  -1.1  -9.8 5.9 4.6 -1.3  -22.4 
unweighted 
average  11.9 10.7  -1.2  -10.4 5.6  3.6  -1.9  -34.6 
Source: Own calculations using ECHP (2001) 
In Table 9, we show the results for some particularly relevant groups who are indirectly 
affected by discrimination: dependent adults and children below 16 years old. The 
reduction in poverty risks for the first group is important in countries like Germany 
(17.5 percent, in relative terms) and in Austria or France (9 and 8 percent, respectively). 
In general, child poverty would be reduced significantly by removing female wage 
discrimination (16.5 to 15.5 percent of reduction in all countries), with the largest 
relative reduction in Portugal (2.4 points, 11 percent) and Austria, Ireland, Denmark 
and Germany (around 9 percent). Interestingly, a country with a very low total impact 
of discrimination on poverty, like Denmark, shows a relatively large reduction of child 
poverty when discrimination is removed, the opposite of what happens in countries like 
Spain where the total impact of discrimination on poverty is large but its impact on 
child poverty is much smaller.   23
 
Table 9. Impact of discrimination on poverty risks in EU countries: dependent 
individuals 
Head-Count Ratio = number of poor / population (in %) 
 
 
Dependent Adults (above 16 years)
 
 
Children (below 16 years) 
  Country 
) (x P   *) (x P   P Δ   r P Δ   ) (x P *) (x P P Δ   r P Δ  
Germany  10.8 8.9  -1.9  -17.5 12.4  11.4 -1.0  -8.4 
Denmark  24.8 24.8 0.0  0.0 9.7  8.9  -0.8  -8.5 
Belgium  18.0 17.7  -0.3  -1.4 8.9  8.8 -0.1  -1.3 
France  17.5 16.1  -1.4  -8.1 20.0 18.6 -1.4  -6.8 
UK  20.1 18.6  -1.5  -7.6 20.7 19.2 -1.4  -6.9 
Ireland  12.4 11.8  -0.6  -4.9 21.7 19.8 -1.8  -8.4 
Italy  27.8 27.3  -0.5  -1.8 22.0 21.6 -0.3  -1.6 
Greece  24.2 23.0  -1.2  -5.0 16.0 15.3 -0.7  -4.2 
Spain  23.2 22.1  -1.1  -4.7 22.6 21.4 -1.2  -5.4 
Portugal  18.8 17.7  -1.2  -6.1 22.6 20.2 -2.4  -10.7 
Austria  15.8 14.4  -1.4  -9.0 8.7  7.8 -0.9  -10.3 
Finland  13.6 13.6 0.0  0.0 13.4 12.7  -0.6  -4.8 
unweighted 
average  18.9 18.0  -0.9  -5.5 16.5 15.5 -1.1  -6.4 
Source: Own calculations using ECHP (2001) 
Finally, we believe that it is interesting to further focus our analysis on the effect of 
removing discrimination on a particular household type that seems to be facing an 
extremely high and increasing poverty risk in many developed countries frequently 
associated with the so-called feminization  of poverty phenomenon: a single-parent 
household with one or more dependent children. This demographic group accounts for 
more than 6 percent of the population in the UK and around 3 percent in Belgium, 
France, Ireland and Finland while, in contrast, it is still small (in demographic terms) in 
most Southern European countries. In this sense, even if one should be cautious in the 
interpretation of results due to the low sample size, Figure 2 consistently shows a very 
large poverty risk, more than 25 percent in all countries, with only a few exceptions 
(Italy, Finland, Austria and Belgium). Interestingly, we find that the impact of 
removing female wage discrimination on the poverty risk of this group is particularly 
large. This does not come as a surprise if, as one would expect, many of them are 
female-headed. Our results show that between 35 and 40 percent of poor single-parent 
households would cross the poverty line if discrimination was removed. It is interesting 
to underline, however, that this happens in a similar way in countries that are radically 
different in their gender wage gap size, such as Denmark and Spain. This percentage, in 
fact, would involve more than 10 percent of all individuals actually living in those types 
of households in these two countries.   24
Figure 2 
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Source: Own calculations using ECHP (2001) 
  5.4 The role of segregation 
So far, all of the results presented are based on a wide notion of discrimination, due to 
the fact that estimated wages were conditioned only on education and experience. 
Therefore, any wage gap arising through gender segregation by type of employment 
also is interpreted as discrimination. In order to use a narrower notion of discrimination 
that moves towards the idea of “equal pay for equal work”, we condition wage 
estimations on a list of employment variables such as the firm activity, the number of 
regular paid employees in the local unit of the firm, the type of contract held (permanent 
or fixed-term, full-time or part-time), the type of occupation (managers, professionals, 
technicians, clerks, service workers or other occupations), the individual’s job status 
(supervisory, intermediate, not supervisory) and whether employee skills are higher 
than those actually needed for the job (overqualified). In this case, as it is shown in 
Table 10
22, in most countries, gender discrimination is lower than when we consider a 
wider notion of discrimination that includes gender job segregation. Thus, a smaller 
number of females are discriminated and the average wage gap is also substantially 
smaller. Consequently, the impacts of compensations due to female wage discrimination 
on poverty indices are generally more moderate. This is particularly the case for Spain 
and Portugal, where all households’ poverty risk is cut down in about 5-8 percent 
instead of the previous 10 percent, and in the case of female wage earners, the reduction 
                                                 
22 See Tables A1.b to A9 and Figures A1-A2 in the Appendix for more details.    25
drops to about 38-47 percent, in contrast to the 60 percent obtained previously. Note 
that reductions are also relevant for Ireland and Austria. This seems to suggest that, in 
these countries, a large part of the effect of wage discrimination on poverty is due to 
gender job segregation. 
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Germany  86.8 32.1  62  4.9  -9.5  -27.4 
Denmark  68.2 10.9  52  3.0  -5.3  -27.5 
Belgium  62.6 13.4  29  2.4  -5.2  -42.5 
France  77.2 17.0  39  3.1  -5.3  -28.3 
UK  75.3 16.0  51  2.8  -4.5  -28.4 
Ireland  60.8 16.4  49  3.9  -2.2  -17.5 
Italy  76.3 13.5  19  2.1  -2.0  -15.1 
Greece  82.4 19.8  16  2.5  -3.0  -31.5 
Spain  83.0 23.9  32  3.6  -5.5  -39.2 
Portugal  83.6 28.1  31  5.3  -7.7  -47.3 
Austria  60.9 9.7  25  1.9 -5.2  -24.5 
Finland  70.9 13.2  43  3.4  -3.6  -17.9 
unweighted 
average  74.0 17.8  37  3.2  -4.9  -28.9 
 
However, it is interesting to underline that this is not the case in all countries, given that, 
for example, in Germany or Italy, segregation appears to be rather neutral on its effect 
on the previously estimated female wage gap—given that we find no significant 
difference in the results when moving from one definition of discrimination to the other. 
More surprisingly, the country with the lowest levels of female wage discrimination, 
Denmark, displays many more discriminated female earners with larger wage gaps 
when employment variables are included as explanatory variables. This results in a 
significantly stronger impact of our compensation for discrimination on Danish 
households’ poverty risk. A similar story applies to Belgium, even if the number of 
discriminated women in that particular case drops significantly. Most precisely, when 
we control for employment variables, in countries like Belgium and Denmark, 
compensating discrimination makes poverty incidence reduce up to 5 percent of the 
whole population, a reduction of a similar size to that taking place in other countries   26
like Spain, France, UK or Austria. When the analysis is restricted to female wage 
earners, the effect on poverty risk rises up to 27 percent in Denmark and up to 42 
percent in Belgium. 
6. Conclusions 
The existence of wage gaps due to different market returns, to characteristics such as 
education or experience for men and women, has been so far well-documented and 
often referred to as wage discrimination. There is also wide evidence in the literature on 
income distribution linking the performance of low-income households’ members in the 
labor market to an increasing household poverty risk in many rich countries. In this 
paper, we analyze the link between these two phenomena, providing a measure of the 
impact of discrimination against women on poverty and family income inequality. We 
do that by comparing, for each household in the sample, its actual total family income to 
a counterfactual one in which wage discrimination against women has been removed. 
This counterfactual family income is based on the estimation of individual gender wage 
gaps explained by different returns that are then aggregated within households.  
Results using the ECHP show that discrimination is important in countries like Spain, 
Portugal and Germany. In these countries, more than 90 percent of female wage earners 
are discriminated, and these women are getting between 80 and 210 cents per hour less 
than a similar male, which, on average, can account for a third part of their 
corresponding salaries. The income loss due to discrimination against females in these 
countries represents, on average, about 5 or 6 percent of total family income. The 
situation is radically different in countries like Denmark or Belgium, where female 
wage discrimination is found to be smaller and the loss of family income is estimated to 
be about 1.5 percent of the total. The compensation for discrimination in many of the 
countries considered tends to be larger in richer households even if its final effect on 
overall inequality is found to be regressive (even if rather small).  
Empirical results also support that, in spite of the extremely low employment rates 
among females living in low-income households, removing discrimination from their 
wages would substantially reduce poverty in most EU countries. This impact varies 
widely across the EU, being larger in countries with highest levels of discrimination 
(where about 10 percent of the poor would leave poverty), and smaller in those with 
lowest levels (where only between 2 and 4 percent of the poor would cross the poverty 
threshold). However, the impact of discrimination on poverty is critical in all countries   27
for working females and their households, with a notable effect in many of them on 
reducing poverty among dependent children and dependent adults. Special mention 
should be paid to single-mother households, a small but expanding demographic group, 
which are facing increasing poverty in most EU countries and who are conforming the 
process of the so-called feminization of poverty.  
The use of a narrower concept of discrimination, trying to separate strict wage 
difference for equal work from job segregation, reduces the gender wage gap and its 
effects on poverty in several countries, mainly Spain, France and the UK. This implies 
that compensating households for discrimination in this context would reduce these 
countries’ poverty risk still in 5 percent. Countries like Ireland and Austria also show a 
particularly large reduction of the number of discriminated women when we condition 
wages on employment variables. In contrast, in the particular cases of Denmark and 
Belgium, wage differences are actually wider if we compare male and female pay in a 
similar job as a consequence of the relevant role that job segregation has in favoring the 
reduction of male-female wage differences. Consequently, compensating households for 
discrimination in these countries also pushes approximately 5 percent of the poor 
population out of poverty. 
In our view, the evidence we present in this paper supports the idea that gender-specific 
equal-opportunity policies in the labor market are expected to have a significant 
collateral effect on promoting social inclusion of some particularly disadvantaged poor 
households in the EU, showing the strong complementarity of these two main goals 
stressed by the Lisbon European Council in 2000. 
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Appendix 
Table A1.a Full-Maximum likelihood estimates: wage equations without employment variables 
 
Female, Private Sector  Germany     Denmark   Belgium   France    UK    Ireland     Italy    Greece   Spain    Portugal   Austria    Finland    
university  0.409  *  0.231  * 0.234 * 0.374 * 0.181 * 0.300 * 0.389 * 0.380 * 0.421 * 0.793 * 0.412 * 0.192 * 
secondary school  0.196  *  0.086    0.052   0.248 * 0.112 * 0.100 * 0.163 * 0.120 * 0.191 * 0.275 * 0.231 * 0.018    
age  0.055  *  0.021    -0.006   0.046 * 0.042 * 0.020    0.037 * 0.054 * 0.035 * 0.035 * 0.034 * 0.010    
age
2  -0.0006 * -0.0002   0.0001  -0.0005 * -0.0005 * -0.0002     -0.0004 * -0.0006 * -0.0004 * -0.0004 * -0.0003 * -0.0001    
tenure 1-5 years  0.139 * 0.021  -0.005   0.045   0.028   0.081  *  0.053   0.094 * 0.097 * 0.050  -0.022    0.038    
tenure 5-15 years  0.167 * 0.064  0.054   0.157  * -0.037   0.200  *  0.119 * 0.146 * 0.246 * 0.124 * 0.026    0.088 * 
tenure 15+ years  0.228  *  0.049    0.116 * 0.328 * 0.012   0.147 * 0.155 * 0.240 * 0.334 * 0.117 * 0.130 * 0.156 * 
unemployment spell  0.015    0.055   0.017  -0.008   0.002  -0.026     0.021   0.010   0.105 * 0.007   0.035    0.047    
long-term unemp. spell  -0.031    0.066 * 0.004  -0.055  * -0.048   -0.008      -0.012   0.007   0.031   0.023   0.014    -0.007    
previous experience  -0.007    0.020  -0.040   0.015   0.046   0.000      0.026   0.023   0.056   -0.026   0.026    0.077    
constant  0.349      1.587  * 1.887 * 0.733 * 1.418 * 1.607 * 0.446 * -0.330   0.142   -0.105   0.857 * 1.482 * 
N of uncensored observations 1,780     521    545    1,162    1,532    566     1,042    607    1,265    1,388    793     721    
Female, Public Sector  Germany     Denmark   Belgium   France    UK    Ireland     Italy    Greece   Spain    Portugal   Austria    Finland    
university  0.409  *  0.250  * 0.346 * 0.423 * 0.197 * 0.568 * 0.461 * 0.459 * 0.374 * 0.731 * 0.329 * 0.268 * 
secondary school  0.179  *  0.092    0.143 * 0.212 * 0.047   0.224 * 0.215 * 0.202   0.096   0.284 * 0.241 * 0.034    
age  0.057 * 0.038 * 0.042 * 0.065  * 0.022  0.044    0.006   0.047   0.029   -0.009   0.042    0.021    
age
2  -0.0006 * -0.0004 * -0.0004 * -0.0007 * -0.0003  -0.0005    0.0000  -0.0004  -0.0003   0.0002  -0.0005     -0.0002     
tenure 1-5 years  0.007    0.086 * 0.008   0.248  * 0.060   0.056      0.109  * 0.143 * 0.130   -0.050   -0.028    -0.003    
tenure 5-15 years  0.199  *  0.125  * 0.091   0.333 * 0.109 * 0.157 * 0.093   0.129   0.293 * 0.037   0.000    0.006    
tenure 15+ years  0.250  *  0.088    0.087   0.403 * 0.107 * 0.115    0.107   0.161   0.395 * 0.168   0.002    -0.006    
unemployment spell  -0.064 * -0.006   0.041  -0.021   -0.100   -0.050     -0.014   0.022  -0.079   0.113 * 0.006    0.093 * 
long-term unemp. spell  -0.107  *  -0.006    -0.007   -0.136 * -0.130 * -0.050     0.000  -0.002   0.016   -0.027  -0.089    0.038    
previous experience  0.082    -0.030  -0.069  * -0.067   0.041   -0.162  *  -0.027   0.058   -0.030   -0.086   -0.055    -0.029    
constant  0.602      1.290  * 0.772 * 0.248   2.025 * 1.323 * 1.450 * 0.147   1.035   0.853   0.960 * 1.221 * 
N of uncensored observations 710      611    394   722   694   229    718   331   436   564   310    699    
* Significant at 5%.  
Dummies have been included for region and missings and selection bias for non-participation has been corrected. Reference: primary studies, no tenure and no previous 
experience or unemployment spell.    32
 
Male, Private Sector  Germany     Denmark   Belgium   France    UK    Ireland     Italy    Greece   Spain    Portugal   Austria    Finland    
university  0.449  *  0.323  * 0.280 * 0.428 * 0.202 * 0.262 * 0.328 * 0.345 * 0.302 * 0.715 * 0.505 * 0.242 * 
secondary school  0.209 * 0.170 * 0.116 * 0.179  * 0.082  * 0.041      0.156 * 0.189 * 0.133 * 0.222 * 0.289 * 0.060 * 
age  0.087  *  0.029  * -0.012   0.063 * 0.067 * 0.031 * 0.038 * 0.039 * -0.012   0.020   0.028 * 0.014    
age
2  -0.0010 * -0.0003   0.0002  -0.0006 * -0.0008 * -0.0003      -0.0004 * -0.0003   0.0003   -0.0002   -0.0002    -0.0001    
tenure 1-5 years  0.046    -0.027   0.002  0.060 * -0.017   0.068    0.031   0.017   0.093 * -0.023   0.052    0.062    
tenure 5-15 years  0.229 * 0.009  0.024  0.179  * 0.032   0.141  *  0.073 * 0.057   0.201 * 0.069   0.118 * 0.092 * 
tenure 15+ years  0.245  *  0.021    0.123 * 0.284 * -0.013   0.232 * 0.060   0.154 * 0.282 * 0.117 * 0.135 * 0.029    
unemployment spell  -0.011    -0.018   0.042  0.029 * 0.062  0.091    0.006   0.019   0.060   0.025   0.006    0.010    
long-term unemp. spell  -0.035  * 0.002  -0.021   -0.006   0.005   0.042      -0.015   -0.038   -0.008   -0.013   -0.051 * -0.033    
previous experience  0.056    0.038  -0.008   -0.048   0.035   0.017      -0.022   0.036   0.017   0.034  0.075  *  -0.052     
constant  -0.147     1.495  * 1.918 * 0.485 * 0.917 * 1.226 * 0.640 * 0.096   1.531 * 0.446 * 0.983 * 1.594 * 
N of uncensored observations 2,335     839  663   1,629    1,750   657      1,782   948    2,105   1,959   1,040    1,009    
Male, Public Sector  Germany     Denmark   Belgium   France    UK    Ireland     Italy    Greece   Spain    Portugal   Austria    Finland    
university  0.409  *  0.250  * 0.346 * 0.423 * 0.197 * 0.568 * 0.461 * 0.459 * 0.374 * 0.329 * 0.268 * 0.450 * 
secondary school  0.179  *  0.092    0.143 * 0.212 * 0.047   0.224 * 0.215 * 0.202   0.096   0.241 * 0.034    0.252 * 
age  0.057 * 0.038 * 0.042 * 0.065  * 0.022   0.044      0.006   0.047   0.029   0.042   0.021    0.053 * 
age
2  -0.0006 * -0.0004 * -0.0004 * -0.0007 * -0.0003  -0.0005     0.0000  -0.0004  -0.0003  -0.0005  -0.0002     -0.0005  * 
tenure 1-5 years  0.007    0.086 * 0.008  0.248  * 0.060   0.056      0.109 * 0.143 * 0.130   -0.028  -0.003    -0.157 * 
tenure 5-15 years  0.199  *  0.125  * 0.091   0.333 * 0.109 * 0.157 * 0.093  0.129   0.293  * 0.000  0.006      -0.054     
tenure 15+ years  0.250  *  0.088    0.087   0.403 * 0.107 * 0.115    0.107   0.161   0.395 * 0.002  -0.006    0.009    
unemployment spell  -0.064 * -0.006   0.041  -0.021   -0.100   -0.050     -0.014   0.022   -0.079   0.006  * 0.093 * -0.037    
long-term unemp. spell  -0.107  *  -0.006    -0.007   -0.136 * -0.130 * -0.050     0.000  -0.002   0.016   -0.089   0.038    -0.027    
previous experience  0.082    -0.030  -0.069  * -0.067   0.041  -0.162  *  -0.027   0.058   -0.030   -0.055   -0.029    0.140 * 
constant  0.602    1.290  0.772  0.248  * 2.025   1.323      1.450   0.147   1.035   0.960   1.221    0.739    
N of uncensored observations 521    285  317  567   326   217      789   460   422   416  336      342     
* Significant at 5%.  
Note: Dummies have been included for region. Dummies were also included for cases where there was an important number of missing values. Selection bias for non-
participation has been corrected. Reference: primary studies, no tenure and no previous experience or unemployment spell.    33
Table A1.b Full-Maximum likelihood estimates: wage equations with employment variables 
 
Female, Private Sector  Germany     Denmark    Belgium    France     UK     Ireland     Italy     Greece     Spain     Portugal    Austria     Finland    
university  0.227 * 0.117   0.077   0.148 * 0.082 * 0.088    0.208 * 0.214 * 0.160 * 0.197 * 0.114    0.084 * 
secondary school  0.093 * 0.040  -0.026   0.120 * 0.061 * 0.028    0.079 * 0.064 * 0.121 * -0.012   0.115 * 0.004    
age  0.044 * 0.005  -0.003   0.034 * 0.033 * 0.018 * 0.029 * 0.045 * 0.018   0.032 * 0.012    0.006    
age
2  -0.0005 * 0.0000   0.0001   -0.0004 * -0.0004 * -0.0002    -0.0003 * -0.0005 * -0.0002   -0.0004 * -0.0001    0.0000    
tenure 1-5 years  0.096 *  -0.023  -0.030   0.008   0.026   0.055    0.053   0.066 * 0.060 * 0.010   -0.049    0.020    
tenure 5-15 years  0.087 * 0.004   0.004   0.101 * 0.004   0.120 * 0.113 * 0.096 * 0.165 * 0.045   -0.022    0.056    
tenure 15+ years  0.136 * -0.013  0.047   0.213 * -0.048   0.091    0.133 * 0.149 * 0.249 * 0.075   0.060    0.094 * 
unemployment spell  0.016     0.043   0.004   -0.001   0.018   -0.032    0.016   0.000   0.051   0.004   0.023    0.044    
long-term unemp. spell  -0.011    0.060  -0.005   -0.049 * -0.009   0.004     -0.003   0.012   0.008   0.033   0.016      0.001     
previous experience  -0.004    -0.023  -0.023   0.009   0.013  -0.015    0.014   0.005   0.034  -0.003   0.020    0.051    
permanent employment  0.216 * 0.214 * 0.044   0.142 * 0.031   0.050    0.016   0.086 * 0.075 * 0.060   0.069    0.080 * 
part-time  0.051     0.147  * 0.108  * 0.062         0.037    0.114 * 0.127 * 0.171 * 0.035   0.128 * 0.122 * 
agriculture, forestry, fishing  -0.086    -0.249   0.068  -0.285 * -0.057   0.319 * 0.136  -0.249   -0.061   0.028  0.030     -0.176     
energy  0.137      -0.027   0.151   -0.242   0.129   0.241      0.064  -0.170  * -0.109   -0.322  * 0.183     0.141     
manufacture of food  -0.068    0.072  -0.089   -0.067   0.000   -0.005    0.130  -0.167  * -0.026   -0.078   -0.069      -0.080     
manufacture of textiles  -0.138 * 0.044  -0.188 * -0.140   -0.144   0.043    0.005    -0.210 * -0.204 * -0.058   -0.086    -0.037    
manufacture of wood, paper products  -0.047    0.037  -0.038   -0.108   -0.119   -0.039    0.007  -0.216  * -0.143   0.134   0.021     -0.047     
manufacture of energy products  0.029      0.001   0.041   -0.031   0.175   0.187      0.098 * -0.271 * -0.172   -0.080   0.029    0.119    
other manufacturing  -0.045    -0.011  -0.269 * -0.017   -0.010   0.050    0.051   0.036  -0.082   0.160 * 0.023     -0.038     
construction  -0.071    -0.017  -0.079  -0.201  * 0.039   0.202    0.080  -0.260  * -0.017   0.226   0.016    0.066    
trade and repair  -0.126 * -0.042   -0.091   -0.131 * -0.186 * 0.085      0.113 * -0.292 * -0.138 * 0.144 * 0.003     -0.062    
hotels and restaurants  -0.242 * -0.077  -0.054   -0.158   -0.218 * 0.100    0.135 * -0.170  * -0.112   0.049   0.016     -0.009     
transport and communication  -0.124    -0.130   0.004   -0.077   -0.093   0.043    0.016  -0.139   -0.003   0.211 * -0.028      -0.022     
financial intermediation  -0.053      0.036   0.080   -0.042   0.017   0.231  *  0.206  * -0.101   0.113   0.381  * 0.072      0.084     
real state  -0.063    0.085  -0.015   -0.093   -0.025   0.076    0.074   -0.194 * -0.105   0.104   -0.005    0.039    
education  -0.002    0.016  -0.023   -0.176   -0.128   0.323 * 0.116   -0.311 * 0.047   0.161 * -0.075    0.230    
health and social work  -0.052     0.089    -0.049   -0.153 * -0.190 * 0.198 * 0.079  -0.164   -0.122   0.044  0.045     0.002     
other services and public adm.  -0.137    -0.001   -0.097   -0.163 * -0.124 * 0.073      0.068    -0.277 * -0.278 * 0.028    -0.028    -0.030      34
managers  0.410 * 0.146   0.328 * 0.576 * 0.216 * 0.182 * 0.256   0.415 * 0.423 * 0.717 * 0.389 * 0.312 * 
professionals  0.324 * 0.323 * 0.245 * 0.615 * 0.406 * 0.428 * 0.306 * 0.392 * 0.295 * 0.600 * 0.490 * 0.295 * 
technicians  0.207 * 0.285 * 0.184 * 0.467 * 0.315 * 0.268 * 0.124 * 0.198 * 0.144 * 0.579 * 0.365 * 0.105    
clerks  0.188 * 0.170 * 0.115 * 0.284 * 0.121 * 0.186 * 0.130 * 0.191 * -0.034   0.317 * 0.267 * 0.106 * 
service workers  0.117 * 0.133 * 0.113 * 0.107 * -0.004   0.075    0.048   0.187  * -0.058   0.047   0.124  *  0.104  * 
skilled agriculture workers  -0.025                  -0.203   -0.213   -0.104   -0.005   0.072    0.247 * 
craft trade workers  0.139 * 0.159  0.006   0.222 * 0.043   0.110    0.019   0.033  -0.080   0.063   0.112 *  -0.024     
operators  0.020     0.052    0.239    0.228  * -0.103    0.119     0.023   0.004   0.112   0.118 * 0.077    0.081    
none employee  0.167  *  0.018    -0.263 *      0.530  * -0.101     -0.018   0.287   0.288  * 0.017   0.266  *  -0.083     
1-4 employees
+  -0.266  *  -0.009   -0.155 *      -0.023   -0.116     -0.174 * -0.113 * -0.145 * -0.213 * -0.165 * -0.100 * 
5-19 employees  -0.177  *  -0.072  * -0.097 *           -0.064     -0.098 * -0.076   -0.137 * -0.170 * -0.096 * -0.103 * 
20-49 employees
++  -0.168  *  -0.030    -0.069 *      0.023   0.000      -0.036   -0.104 * -0.075   -0.130 * -0.113 *  -0.091  * 
50-99 employees
+++  0.019     -0.072    -0.009        0.040    -0.005     -0.022   -0.056   -0.052   -0.116 * -0.025    -0.026    
500+ employees        0.050    0.006         0.080  * 0.116  *  -0.023   0.054   0.041   -0.099   -0.074    0.039    
supervisory         0.129 * 0.101 * 0.112 * 0.091 * 0.168 * 0.161 * 0.134 * 0.154 * 0.184 * 0.109 * 0.088 * 
intermediate        0.032    0.041    0.090  * -0.029    0.049     0.007   0.086   0.178 * 0.126 * 0.072 *  0.044    
over-qualification        -0.021    -0.048 * -0.002         -0.074  *  -0.006   -0.033   -0.022   0.034   -0.030    -0.022    
constant  0.525 * 1.716 * 1.902 * 0.818 * 1.484 * 1.533 * 0.639 * 0.051   0.902 * -0.038   1.256 * 1.479 * 
N of uncensored observations  1,780     521    545    1,162    1,532    566     1,042    607    1,265    1,388    793     721    
* Significant at 5%.  
Note: Dummies have been included for region. Dummies also were included for cases where there was an important number of missing values. Selection bias for non-
participation has been corrected. Reference: primary studies, no tenure, no previous experience or unemployment spell, fixed-term/full-time contract, “manufacture of metal 
products, machinery and equipment” activity, elementary occupation, 100-499 regular employees in the local unit, non-supervisory job status, no skills or qualifications for a 
more demanding job. Joined categories: skilled agricultural and fishery workers with craft and related trade workers (Denmark, Belgium, France, UK and Ireland). Duration of 
contract dropped in the UK due to collinearity. Over-qualification not available in Germany and the UK. Job status at current job not available in Germany. Number of 
employees not used in France due to high number of missings. 
+ In the UK 1-9.  
++ In the UK 10-49, in Germany 20-1999. 
+++ In Germany 2000 or more. 
   35
Female, Public Sector  Germany     Denmark    Belgium     France     UK     Ireland     Italy     Greece     Spain     Portugal    Austria     Finland    
university  0.023      0.098   0.148  * 0.083   0.135  * 0.324  *  0.052   0.321   -0.017   0.476 * 0.124   0.112 * 
secondary school  0.025      0.031   0.105  * 0.016   0.043   0.175  *  -0.044  0.187   0.048   0.166  * 0.061   0.029     
age  0.043 * 0.025 * 0.034 * 0.046 * 0.017   0.043 *  -0.012  0.064   0.022   0.012   0.006   0.017     
age
2  -0.0004      -0.0003 * -0.0003  -0.0005  -0.0002  -0.0005      0.0002  -0.0006  -0.0002  0.0000  0.0000  -0.0002     
tenure 1-5 years  0.018      0.043   0.009   0.271  * 0.065  * 0.038      0.047   0.101   0.040    -0.050  0.033   -0.056     
tenure 5-15 years  0.202  *  0.057   0.055   0.276  * 0.137  * 0.082      0.057   0.108   0.121  * 0.042   0.082   -0.060     
tenure 15+ years  0.237  *  0.016   0.048   0.344  * 0.142  * 0.155      0.048   0.138   0.235  * 0.153   0.121   -0.046     
unemployment spell  -0.043     0.001  0.012  -0.010   -0.082   -0.109      -0.024  0.035   -0.120  * 0.090  * -0.035  0.069  * 
long-term unemp. spell  -0.072  * 0.010  -0.005   -0.111  * -0.096  * -0.057      -0.033  0.002   0.010   0.002    -0.060  0.039  * 
previous experience  0.141    -0.036  -0.067  * -0.092    0.041  -0.100     0.001   0.017   0.022   -0.035   0.006   0.014    
permanent employment  0.068      0.040   0.024   0.129  * -0.031   0.071      -0.010  0.078   0.241  * 0.029   0.119   0.082  * 
part-time  -0.002    0.057   0.149 * 0.162 *      -0.027    0.065   0.074   0.096   0.224 * 0.218  * 0.064    
rest of activities  -0.073     0.044  0.073  -0.007   -0.203   0.298    0.158 * 0.040  -0.097  -0.017  -0.101   0.165 * 
transport and communication  0.067     -0.095  * -0.004    0.109  * -0.255  *       0.187 * 0.135    -0.078   0.113   0.174 * -0.027    
Financial interm.+ real state  0.009      -0.024   -0.041   0.040   0.034   0.032      -0.011  0.014   0.206  * 0.200  * -0.067  -0.065     
education  0.086      -0.063   0.067   0.017   -0.103  * 0.185     0.089 * 0.170 * 0.031   0.100 * 0.043   -0.024    
health and social work  -0.072     0.035  0.003  -0.006   -0.039   0.088     -0.025   -0.046   -0.063   -0.050   0.129 * -0.067    
other services  -0.115     0.001    0.103    -0.138  * -0.070          -0.061   0.022   -0.029   0.089   0.026   -0.071    
managers  0.384 * 0.197 * 0.316 * 0.740 * 0.414 * 0.019    0.518 * 0.193    0.419 * 0.771 * 0.485 * 0.419 * 
professionals  0.408 * 0.212 * 0.281 * 0.676 * 0.418 * 0.225 * 0.445 * 0.325 * 0.627 * 0.581 * 0.295 * 0.325 * 
technicians  0.198 * 0.106 * 0.223 * 0.415 * 0.378 * 0.090    0.275 * 0.091    0.244 * 0.563 * 0.273 * 0.166 * 
clerks  0.161 * 0.079   0.194 * 0.289 * 0.263 * -0.047    0.141 * 0.105    0.221 * 0.352 * 0.184 * 0.200 * 
service workers  -0.091      -0.027   0.037   0.137  * 0.141  * -0.109     0.103 * 0.109   0.203 * 0.167 * 0.102   0.081 * 
other occupations  -0.126      -0.094   0.275  * 0.008   0.266  * -0.250      -0.071  0.077   0.143   0.150   0.161   0.112     
none employee  0.076     0.027    -0.037              0.047     -0.111                  0.107    -0.195  * 
1-4 employees
+  -0.153     -0.111  * -0.147  *      -0.028    0.063     -0.086 * -0.083   -0.006   -0.084  -0.179 * -0.062    
5-19 employees  -0.092     -0.022    -0.135  *           0.075     -0.048  -0.053   0.005  -0.059  -0.056  -0.015     
20-49 employees
++  -0.084     -0.030    -0.056         -0.036    -0.037    0.004   -0.030   0.059   -0.069  -0.031   0.053    
50-99 employees
+++  -0.009     0.037    -0.036         0.056    0.142     0.038   -0.026   -0.065   0.003  -0.017   -0.019    
500+ employees        0.029    0.018         -0.007    -0.042     0.039  -0.123  * 0.059   0.009  -0.001   0.005    
supervisory        0.046    0.181    0.154  * 0.200  * 0.108     0.036  -0.070   0.180 * -0.023  0.256 * 0.135 *   36
intermediate        -0.024    0.083  * 0.060  * 0.094  * 0.016     0.052   -0.028   0.037   -0.065   0.098 * -0.028    
over-qualification        -0.023    -0.031    -0.042         0.003     -0.003   -0.008   -0.063 * -0.014  -0.068 * -0.036    
constant  0.786 * 1.570 * 0.897 * 0.427   1.808   1.295 * 1.998 * -0.376   1.057 * 0.195   1.371 * 1.234 * 
N of uncensored observations 710      611   394   722   694   229      718   331   436   564   310   699     
* Significant at 5%.  
Note: Dummies have been included for region. Dummies also were included for cases where there was an important number of missing values. Selection bias for non-
participation has been corrected. Reference: primary studies, no tenure, no previous experience or unemployment spell, fixed-term/full-time contract, “manufacture of metal 
products, machinery and equipment” activity, elementary occupation, 100-499 regular employees in the local unit, non-supervisory job status, no skills or qualifications for a 
more demanding job. Joined categories: skilled agricultural and fishery workers with craft and related trade workers (Denmark, Belgium, France, UK and Ireland). Duration of 
contract dropped in the UK due to collinearity. Over-qualification not available in Germany and the UK. Job status at current job not available in Germany. Number of 
employees not used in France due to high number of missings. 
+ In the UK 1-9.  
++ In the UK 10-49, in Germany 20-1999. 
+++ In Germany 2000 or more. 
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Male, Private Sector  Germany     Denmark    Belgium    France     UK     Ireland     Italy     Greece     Spain     Portugal    Austria     Finland    
university  0.246 * 0.108 * 0.200 * 0.200 * 0.085 * 0.118 * 0.095 * 0.243 * 0.096 * 0.249 * 0.187 * 0.110 * 
secondary school  0.137 * 0.079 * 0.102 * 0.059   0.035   0.018    0.047 * 0.142 * 0.030   0.062   0.141 * 0.036    
age  0.077 * 0.008  -0.001   0.038 * 0.054 * 0.010    0.028 * 0.031 * -0.019   0.012   0.015    0.006    
age
2  -0.0008 * 0.0000   0.0001   -0.0004 * -0.0006 * -0.0001    -0.0002 * -0.0002  0.0003  -0.0001  -0.0001     0.0000     
tenure 1-5 years  0.009      -0.011   0.011   0.020   -0.007   0.000      -0.004   -0.014   0.055 * -0.033   0.057    0.035    
tenure 5-15 years  0.136 * 0.033  -0.017   0.142 * 0.037   0.036    0.010   0.034  0.153  * -0.003   0.066    0.044    
tenure 15+ years  0.130  *  0.062   0.017   0.230  * -0.034   0.208  *  0.008   0.075  0.195  * 0.026   0.102 *  -0.012     
unemployment spell  -0.001    -0.024  0.036 * 0.026 * 0.045   0.060    0.005   0.011  0.041   0.028   0.009     -0.019     
long-term unemp. spell  -0.013    0.015  -0.002   0.004   0.015   0.048    -0.009   -0.035  -0.004   -0.003   -0.016    -0.024    
previous experience  0.047    0.057  -0.026  -0.035   0.001   0.033    0.000   0.020  0.051   0.049   0.071 *  -0.006     
permanent employment  0.209 * 0.031   0.111 * 0.112 * -0.012   0.108 * 0.072 * 0.086 * 0.043   0.071 * 0.093 * 0.078    
part-time  0.326 * -0.107   0.290 * 0.183 *       -0.011    0.177  * 0.145    0.124    0.247  * -0.103     -0.136    
agriculture, forestry, fishing  -0.071     0.020    -0.150   -0.316 * -0.187 * -0.140     0.007   -0.061  -0.140 * 0.069   -0.080    0.029    
energy  0.135  *  0.122  * 0.006   0.003   0.047   0.002      0.012  -0.040   0.072   0.152  -0.060      0.196  * 
manufacture of food  -0.044    0.003  -0.212 * 0.021  -0.117  * 0.018    0.091 * -0.086  -0.102 * -0.050   -0.044    0.078    
manufacture of textiles  -0.115  * 0.006  -0.030  -0.093   -0.250  * -0.328  *  -0.100 * -0.215 * -0.109   -0.077   -0.346 * -0.007    
manufacture of wood, paper products  0.047      0.094  * -0.063  0.049   -0.011   0.071      0.006   -0.059   -0.018  -0.019   -0.003      -0.026     
manufacture of energy products  0.012    0.081  -0.027   0.146 * 0.067   0.092    -0.008    0.149    0.098  * 0.091  * 0.015     -0.003    
other manufacturing  -0.003      0.119  * -0.077  0.005   0.036   -0.015      -0.023   -0.035  -0.041   0.017   -0.033    0.054    
construction  -0.031    0.089 * -0.035   -0.125 * 0.011   0.113 * 0.030   0.041  0.036   0.093 * -0.001    0.035    
trade and repair  -0.080 * 0.033    -0.128 * -0.112 * -0.107 * -0.093    -0.015   -0.063  -0.110 * 0.059   -0.029    0.065    
hotels and restaurants  -0.220     0.031    -0.181 * -0.196 * -0.210 * -0.123    -0.010   -0.057  -0.086   -0.025   -0.024    -0.002    
transport and communication  -0.026      -0.009   -0.063  -0.056   -0.040   0.119     0.077  * 0.109    -0.020   0.060    -0.080     -0.005    
financial intermediation  0.082      0.140  * 0.011   0.031   0.109  * 0.031      0.235  * 0.075    0.337  * 0.586  * 0.037     0.071    
real state  -0.005      0.129  * -0.061  -0.039   0.069   0.048      -0.021   -0.026   0.017   0.003   0.124    0.093 * 
education  -0.301  *  -0.137   -0.036  -0.118   -0.035   -0.012     0.277  * 0.010    0.152    0.297  * -0.075     -0.019    
health and social work  0.043     0.138  -0.216 * -0.323 * -0.084   -0.121    0.039    -0.149    -0.069   -0.261  * -0.080     -0.071    
other services and public adm.  -0.033     0.056    -0.101   -0.229 * -0.152 * 0.015      0.040   -0.047  -0.147   0.060   -0.062    0.102    
managers  0.250 * 0.191 * 0.144 * 0.378 * 0.256 * 0.153 * 0.306 * 0.284 * 0.372 * 0.282    0.367 * 0.149 * 
professionals  0.349 * 0.216 * 0.151 * 0.326 * 0.292 * 0.172 * 0.181 * 0.210 * 0.239 * 0.460 * 0.270 * 0.138 *   38
technicians  0.172 * 0.215 * 0.084   0.198 * 0.277 * 0.190 * 0.130 * 0.130 * 0.208 * 0.302 * 0.326 * 0.122 * 
clerks  0.080      0.130  * 0.008   0.053   0.088  * 0.009      0.079 * 0.081  0.211 * 0.194 * 0.300 *  -0.057     
service workers  0.011    0.012  -0.023  -0.008   0.017   0.001    -0.041   0.179 * 0.056   0.186 * 0.170 *  -0.147  * 
skilled agriculture workers  0.034                 -0.215 * -0.062   0.002   -0.163 * 0.070    0.105    
craft trade workers  0.096  *  0.059   0.017   0.027   0.145  * 0.050      0.011   0.138 * 0.066 * 0.159 * 0.210 * 0.031    
operators  0.075      -0.009   0.020   0.031   0.045   0.028      -0.008   0.127 * 0.036   0.125 * 0.134 * 0.033    
none employee  -0.211 * 0.098    0.090         -0.379 * -0.244 * 0.084   0.653  * -0.053  0.129   0.394  *  -0.120     
1-4 employees
+  -0.313 * -0.185 * -0.138 *       -0.130 * -0.225 * -0.134 * -0.185 * -0.272 * -0.279 * -0.151 * -0.264 * 
5-19 employees  -0.244  *  -0.117  * -0.165 *      0.000    -0.076     -0.053   -0.052  -0.213 * -0.189 * -0.063 *  -0.148  * 
20-49 employees
++  -0.175  *  -0.070  * -0.078 *      -0.121  * -0.007     -0.008   -0.038  -0.141 * -0.157 * -0.034    -0.113  * 
50-99 employees
+++  -0.110  *  -0.086    -0.036        -0.064  * -0.083     -0.020    0.007    -0.099 * -0.130  * 0.032     -0.047    
500+ employees        -0.011    0.074  *      0.010    0.196  *  0.030   0.062  0.006   0.098   0.110 *  0.054    
supervisory         0.067 * 0.011   0.159 * 0.147 * 0.203 * 0.141 * 0.119 * 0.220 * 0.372 * 0.135 * 0.067 * 
intermediate        0.052    0.019    0.083  * 0.025    0.010     0.046 * 0.165 * 0.095 * 0.141 * 0.045 * 0.022    
over-qualification        -0.042    0.038    -0.004         0.005     -0.009   -0.035  -0.013   0.036   -0.009    0.010    
constant  0.024    1.893 * 1.698 * 0.934 * 1.128 * 1.602 * 0.903 * 0.248    1.842 * 0.536 * 1.101 * 1.725 * 
N of uncensored observations  2,335     839  663  1,629   1,750    657     1,782    948  2,105   1,959   1,040      1,009     
* Significant at 5%.  
Note: Dummies have been included for region. Dummies also were included for cases where there was an important number of missing values. Selection bias for non-
participation has been corrected. Reference: primary studies, no tenure, no previous experience or unemployment spell, fixed-term/full-time contract, “manufacture of metal 
products, machinery and equipment” activity, elementary occupation, 100-499 regular employees in the local unit, non-supervisory job status, no skills or qualifications for a 
more demanding job. Joined categories: skilled agricultural and fishery workers with craft and related trade workers (Denmark, Belgium, France, UK and Ireland). Duration of 
contract dropped in the UK due to collinearity. Over-qualification not available in Germany and the UK. Job status at current job not available in Germany. Number of 
employees not used in France due to high number of missings. 
+ In the UK 1-9.  
++ In the UK 10-49, in Germany 20-1999. 
+++ In Germany 2000 or more.   39
 
Male, Public Sector  Germany     Denmark    Belgium    France     UK     Ireland     Italy     Greece     Spain     Portugal    Austria     Finland    
university  0.246 * 0.030  0.157 * 0.111 * 0.124  0.087    0.203 * 0.101    0.098   0.278   0.258 * 0.261 * 
secondary school  0.203  *  -0.050   0.067   0.079   0.092   0.071      0.060  * 0.046  0.097   0.063 * 0.108   0.107    
age  0.047 *  -0.005  -0.018   0.026   0.046  -0.010     0.006   0.008    -0.012  0.005    -0.006  0.021     
age
2  -0.0004  * 0.0001  0.0003  -0.0001  -0.0005  0.0002      0.0000  -0.0001  0.0002  0.0000  0.0002  -0.0002     
tenure 1-5 years  -0.121     -0.010    0.021    0.245  * 0.011    0.091     -0.006  -0.019   0.175  * -0.022  -0.063  0.070    
tenure 5-15 years  0.029     -0.014    0.093    0.340  * 0.023    0.140     0.005   0.013   0.112  * -0.054   -0.013  0.046     
tenure 15+ years  0.024     -0.112   0.175 * 0.312 * -0.027   0.261    0.055   0.153   0.197   0.034   0.057   0.076    
unemployment spell  -0.043  *  -0.010   0.062   0.002   0.041   0.028      -0.010  -0.043   0.015  * 0.123  * 0.091   -0.063     
long-term unemp. spell  -0.009     0.027  -0.027  -0.003   -0.052   0.047     -0.004   -0.062 * 0.010   0.057   0.087 * -0.032    
previous experience  0.165 * 0.071   0.084 * -0.122 * 0.033   0.139    0.014  0.077  0.017   -0.149  -0.020  -0.033     
permanent employment  0.045     0.047    0.110    0.149  * -0.029    0.159     0.092   0.276 * 0.150 * 0.097   0.048   0.110    
part-time  -0.094    -0.071   0.435 * -0.056         0.080     -0.020  0.221  * 0.128   0.530  * 0.242   0.168     
rest of activities  -0.085    -0.076  -0.007   0.153 * 0.051  -0.044      -0.019  0.061   0.067    -0.122  0.033   0.089     
transport and communication  -0.010    -0.021   0.046   0.097 * -0.007  -0.136      -0.019  0.050   0.113   0.125  * -0.024  0.090     
Financial interm.+ real state  0.060    0.046  0.055   -0.054   -0.153  * -0.052     0.012   0.014   0.273 * 0.479 * 0.082   0.004    
education  -0.041      -0.205  * -0.075  -0.039   -0.094  *        0.048   0.255 * 0.003   0.074   0.094   -0.004    
health and social work  -0.147 * -0.039   -0.051   -0.126 * -0.146 * -0.086    -0.011  -0.125  * -0.051  -0.134  0.053   0.003    
other services  -0.071    -0.079  -0.086  -0.204   0.022          0.078   -0.140 * 0.166 * 0.150  -0.090   -0.032    
managers  0.487 * 0.336 * 0.244 * 0.423 * 0.300 * 0.205 * 0.402 * 0.155    0.116   0.847 * 0.395 * 0.278 * 
professionals  0.515 * 0.206 * 0.198 * 0.533 * 0.355 * 0.405 * 0.438 * 0.211 * 0.414 * 0.411 * 0.064   0.330     
technicians  0.347 * 0.155 * 0.095   0.325 * 0.289 * 0.235 * 0.194 * 0.091    0.177 * 0.523 * 0.188 * 0.122     
clerks  0.163    0.004  0.105   0.198 * 0.065  0.191  *  0.098 * -0.037  -0.071 * 0.316 * 0.140   0.094     
service workers  0.303 * 0.098  -0.116   0.227 * 0.225 * 0.394 * 0.216  * 0.000  0.160  * 0.406 * 0.067   0.067    
other occupations  0.229 * 0.110   0.000   0.177 * 0.184 * 0.203 * 0.150 * -0.043  -0.041   0.164   0.077   0.163     
none employee  0.093     0.084    -0.029             -0.317     0.139    0.155              -0.337 * -0.196  * 
1-4 employees
+  0.080     0.182    0.150         -0.083    -0.046     -0.058  -0.062   -0.145  -0.090  -0.141  -0.094     
5-19 employees  0.007     -0.071    0.082              -0.011     -0.052  -0.028   -0.138 * -0.043  -0.088 * -0.154  * 
20-49 employees
++  -0.159  *  -0.018   0.064         -0.075   0.010      -0.015  -0.035   0.075   0.014  -0.018  -0.079     
50-99 employees
+++  -0.030     0.024    0.047         -0.104    0.056     0.012   -0.017   0.013   0.114  -0.005  -0.085     
500+ employees        -0.012    0.076  *      -0.042    0.084    0.064   0.070   0.030   0.057   0.012   0.021      40
supervisory        -0.044    0.078    0.120  * 0.233  * 0.088    0.115 * 0.068   0.042   0.084   0.094   0.120 * 
intermediate        -0.005    0.067  * 0.087  * 0.041    0.095    0.080 * 0.057   0.047   0.227   0.049   0.103    
over-qualification        -0.046    -0.035   -0.022         0.014     -0.021  -0.018   -0.003  -0.063  -0.008  -0.048     
constant  0.604    2.308 * 1.799  * 0.851 * 1.042  2.031  *  1.356  * 1.123  1.620  * 0.660  1.550   1.209    
N of uncensored observations 521      285   317   567   326   217      789   460   422   416   336   342     
* Significant at 5%.  
Note: Dummies have been included for region. Dummies also were included for cases where there was an important number of missing values. Selection bias for non-
participation has been corrected. Reference: primary studies, no tenure, no previous experience or unemployment spell, fixed-term/full-time contract, “manufacture of metal 
products, machinery and equipment” activity, elementary occupation, 100-499 regular employees in the local unit, non-supervisory job status, no skills or qualifications for a 
more demanding job. Joined categories: skilled agricultural and fishery workers with craft and related trade workers (Denmark, Belgium, France, UK and Ireland). Duration of 
contract dropped in the UK due to collinearity. Over-qualification not available in Germany and the UK. Job status at current job not available in Germany. Number of 
employees not used in France due to high number of missings. 
+ In the UK 1-9.  
++ In the UK 10-49, in Germany 20-1999. 
+++ In Germany 2000 or more.   41
 
Table A2. Gender wage gap in EU countries 
with employment variables in wage regressions 
 

























Germany  30.0 0.248 0.226  91.2 0.317  0.184  58.0 
Denmark  54.5 0.031 0.028  90.9 0.065  0.085  130.1 
Belgium  37.1 0.065 0.046  70.7 0.067  0.113  169.4 
France  39.1 0.165 0.117  71.1 0.208  0.085  41.0 
UK  32.2 0.203 0.127  62.5 0.139  0.045  32.2 
Ireland  28.1 0.097 0.000  -0.2 0.195  0.216  111.1 
Italy  38.7 0.177 0.162  91.4  0.022 -0.008  -38.0 
Greece  34.7 0.322 0.208  64.7 0.076  0.124  163.0 
Spain  23.1 0.321 0.199  62.0 0.081  0.052  63.6 
Portugal  25.4 0.281 0.236  83.9 0.079  0.129  163.0 
Austria  28.4 0.147 0.020  13.3 0.047  0.072  152.5 
Finland  49.8 0.068 0.060  88.4 0.122  0.099  81.0 
unweighted 
average  35.1 0.177 0.119  65.8 0.118  0.100  93.9 
Note: The raw wage gap is computed as the difference between the log male and log female hourly wage. 
The estimated gap is the gap explained by different returns (i.e. that not explained through different 
endowments). 




Table A3. Estimated discrimination gap among working women in EU countries 
with employment variables in wage regressions 
 
All female wage earners  Private Sector  Public Sector 































Germany  86.8 1.9  32.1  88.1 2.0 33.8 84.0  1.8  27.9 
Denmark  68.2 1.0  10.9  62.1 0.8 8.6  73.4 1.2  12.8 
Belgium  62.6 1.0  13.4  58.5 0.7 10.8 69.7  1.4  17.8 
France  77.2 1.1  17.0  79.6 1.1 18.3 73.4  1.2  14.8 
UK  75.3 1.3  16.0  82.7 1.4 17.5 59.8  1.1  12.9 
Ireland  60.8 1.4  16.4  50.9 0.7 8.5  86.3 3.2  36.4 
Italy  76.3 0.7  13.5  93.8 1.0 19.3 48.6  0.3  4.4 
Greece  82.4 0.7  19.8  93.8 0.8 24.9 60.9  0.4  10.1 
Spain  83.0 1.0  23.9  90.1 1.1 26.8 59.2  0.8  14.3 
Portugal  83.6 0.8  28.1  89.8 0.7 30.1 65.3  0.9  22.1 
Austria  60.9 0.6 9.7  58.0 0.5 8.4  68.1 0.8  12.9 
Finland  70.9 0.9  13.2  66.7 0.8 12.4 75.1  1.0  14.1 
unweighted 
average  74.0 1.0  17.8  76.2 1.0 18.3 68.6  1.2  16.7 
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Table A4. Households’ incomes in EU countries: monthly average amounts per equivalent adult 
with employment variables in wage regressions 
 





















































Germany  1,319 244  18.9  62  4.9  1,381  306  20.9 
Denmark  1,691 519  28.9  52  3.0  1,743  570  30.1 
Belgium  1,190 287  23.0  29  2.4  1,219  316  24.1 
France  1,354 331  23.7  39  3.1  1,393  370  24.8 
UK  1,854 407  20.8  51  2.8  1,905  457  22.0 
Ireland  1,269 335  26.6  49  3.9  1,318  384  26.6 
Italy  882 164 17.1  19  2.1  900  183 18.0 
Greece  649 102 14.3  16  2.5  665  117 15.3 
Spain  847 172 17.3  32  3.6  879  204 18.8 
Portugal  640 151 21.7  31  5.3  671  182 24.0 
Austria  1,258 259  19.8  25  1.9  1,282  283  20.6 
Finland  1,199 344  26.7  43  3.4  1,242  387  27.9 
unweighted 
Average  1,179 276  21.6  37  3.2  1,217  313  22.7 
 
 
Table A5. Impact of discrimination on inequality in 
EU countries 
Gini index 
with employment variables in wage regressions 
 
 
country  ) (x I   *) (x I   r I Δ  
Germany  0.248 0.251  1.2 
Denmark  0.214 0.217  1.2 
Belgium  0.228 0.230  0.6 
France  0.297 0.297 -0.1 
UK  0.304 0.304  0.2 
Ireland  0.284 0.289  1.7 
Italy  0.281 0.283  0.7 
Greece  0.333 0.333  0.1 
Spain  0.311 0.314  1.0 
Portugal  0.376 0.374 -0.6 
Austria  0.213 0.215  1.2 
Finland  0.252 0.257  1.9 
unweighted 
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Discrimination compensation by households' equivalent income deciles (%)

















Table A6. Impact of discrimination on poverty in EU countries 
with employment variables in wage regressions 
 
 
Head-count ratio (H)  
number of poor / population (in %)
 
 
Poverty Gap ratio (HI) 
H · average poverty gap (in %) 
 
Country 
) (x P   *) (x P P Δ r P Δ ) (x P *) (x P P Δ   r P Δ  
Germany  10.1 9.2  -1.0  -9.5  2.1 1.8  -0.3  -13.6 
Denmark  13.8 13.0  -0.7  -5.3  2.4 2.2  -0.1  -5.7 
Belgium  11.2 10.6  -0.6  -5.2  1.8 1.7  -0.1  -6.4 
France  17.4 16.5  -0.9  -5.3  4.3 4.1  -0.2  -5.4 
UK  16.1 15.4  -0.7  -4.5  4.2 4.1  -0.1  -3.5 
Ireland  18.5 18.1  -0.4  -2.2  4.0 3.8  -0.2  -4.7 
Italy  17.7 17.3  -0.4  -2.0  4.7 4.5  -0.2  -4.1 
Greece  19.1 18.5  -0.6  -3.0  5.6 5.4  -0.2  -3.3 
Spain  17.6 16.6  -1.0  -5.5  4.4 4.2  -0.2  -4.7 
Portugal  17.6 16.3  -1.4  -7.7  5.0 4.7  -0.3  -5.5 
Austria  9.3 8.8  -0.5  -5.2  1.6 1.5  -0.1  -5.2 
Finland  14.0 13.5  -0.5  -3.6  3.6 3.4  -0.1  -3.9 
unweighted 
Average  15.2 14.5  -0.7  -4.9 3.6  3.5 -0.2  -5.5 
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Table A7. Impact of discrimination on poverty risks in EU countries:  
households with female earners 
Head-Count Ratio = number of poor / population (in %) 
with employment variables in wage regressions 
 
 
Households with female earners 
 
Female wages being more than 
50% of hh incomes  Country 
) (x P   *) (x P   P Δ   r P Δ   ) (x P   *) (x P   P Δ   r P Δ  
Germany  8.2 6.1  -2.1  -25.3 15.2 10.7  -4.5  -29.8 
Denmark  4.2 3.0  -1.2  -27.5 9.0  5.6  -3.4  -37.5 
Belgium  3.9 2.8  -1.2  -29.5 11.0  7.9  -3.1  -28.1 
France  7.6 5.7  -1.9  -25.1 12.3  8.5  -3.8  -30.8 
UK  6.1 4.8  -1.4  -22.5 11.5  8.2  -3.3  -28.5 
Ireland  7.6 6.8  -0.8  -10.5 15.3 13.4  -1.9  -12.5 
Italy  7.1 6.1  -1.0  -13.5 16.1 14.3  -1.8  -11.3 
Greece  6.1 4.3  -1.8  -29.8 15.3 11.5  -3.8  -25.0 
Spain  7.0 4.6  -2.4  -34.5 10.9  7.5  -3.4  -31.0 
Portugal  6.4 3.8  -2.6  -41.1 13.1  5.9  -7.2  -54.7 
Austria  4.0 3.0  -1.0  -23.9 10.2  7.8  -2.4  -23.5 
Finland  5.2 4.3  -0.9  -18.0 10.8  8.7  -2.1  -19.2 
unweighted 







Table A8. Impact of discrimination on poverty risks in EU countries: females 
Head-Count Ratio = number of poor / population (in %) 
with employment variables in wage regressions 
 
 
Females 25-55 years old 
 
Female wage earners 
Country 
) (x P   *) (x P   P Δ   r P Δ   ) (x P   *) (x P   P Δ   r P Δ  
Germany  9.4 8.2  -1.3  -13.3 6.8  5.0  -1.9  -27.4 
Denmark  7.4 6.4  -1.0  -13.0 5.0  3.6  -1.4  -27.5 
Belgium  9.7 8.4  -1.2  -12.9 4.2  2.4  -1.8  -42.5 
France  14.3 13.0  -1.3  -9.0 6.5 4.6 -1.8  -28.3 
UK  11.7 10.5  -1.2  -10.3 6.1  4.3  -1.7  -28.4 
Ireland  15.5 14.8  -0.7  -4.3 6.6 5.4 -1.1  -17.5 
Italy  16.6 16.2  -0.4  -2.5 5.5 4.7 -0.8  -15.1 
Greece  13.6 12.9  -0.7  -5.2 5.8 3.9 -1.8  -31.5 
Spain  15.3 14.0  -1.3  -8.8 6.1 3.7 -2.4  -39.2 
Portugal  11.5 10.1  -1.4  -12.1 4.8  2.5  -2.3  -47.3 
Austria  6.9 6.2  -0.7  -9.9 3.6 2.7 -0.9  -24.5 
Finland  11.3 10.4  -0.9  -7.9 5.9 4.9 -1.1  -17.9 
unweighted 
average  11.9 10.9  -1.0  -9.1 5.6 4.0 -1.6  -28.9 
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Table A9. Impact of discrimination on poverty risks in EU countries: dependent 
individuals 
Head-Count Ratio = number of poor / population (in %) 
with employment variables in wage regressions 
 
 
Dependent Adults (above 16 y. o.)
 
 
Children (below 16 y. o.) 
  Country 
) (x P   *) (x P   P Δ   r P Δ   ) (x P *) (x P P Δ   r P Δ  
Germany  10.8 9.2  -1.6  -14.8 12.4  11.1  -1.3  -10.4 
Denmark  24.8 24.6  -0.2  -0.7 9.7  8.3 -1.4  -14.4 
Belgium  18.0 17.7  -0.3  -1.4 8.9  8.7 -0.2  -2.2 
France  17.5 16.2  -1.3  -7.2 20.0  19.0 -1.0  -5.0 
UK  20.1 20.1 0.0  0.0 20.7 19.8  -0.9  -4.4 
Ireland  12.4 11.8  -0.6  -4.9 21.7  21.2 -0.4  -1.9 
Italy  27.8 27.4  -0.4  -1.4 22.0  21.6 -0.3  -1.5 
Greece  24.2 23.4  -0.8  -3.4 16.0  15.5 -0.5  -3.0 
Spain  23.2 22.7  -0.5  -2.2 22.6  22.3 -0.3  -1.1 
Portugal  18.8 17.6  -1.2  -6.2 22.6  20.5 -2.1  -9.3 
Austria  15.8 15.3  -0.5  -3.1 8.7  8.0 -0.7  -8.0 
Finland  13.6 13.6 0.0  0.0 13.4 12.8  -0.6  -4.7 
unweighted







Impact of discrimination on poverty risk: single-parent households
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